Conceptions of this sort through abstraction seemed perhaps false and vain for this reason, that they perceive the thing otherwise than it subsists. For since they are concerned with matter by itself or form separately, and since none the less neither of these subsists separately, they seem obviously to conceive the thing otherwise than it is, and therefore to be empty. But this is not so (184).

Abstraction in any case is not empty for Abelard because it considers “the qualities the nature has” even though it does “not consider all that it has“. When he considers “only this one among the qualities the nature has the only refers to the attention alone, not to the mode of subsisting”. This process on one hand could be understood to be arbitrary (because we could choose where to point our attention), but on the other hand it is restricted by the nature of things necessarily, and in the second sense is realistic. “Otherwise it would not be reason, but opinion, that is if the understanding should deviate from the state of the thing”( 184). So, the concept formed in the mind by abstraction is a realistic one. But it is always limited always considering only part of the nature of the thing.

There is room to think that the abstraction is not the only way how we get the realistic concepts of the world of physics. Abelard is a monk and a theologian, and not just a natural philosopher. He definitely believes in God, Supreme Intellect and Providence, miracles and prophets. How is it possible to have knowledge of things before they actually exist? It is not by way of abstraction. The ideas of things and their relations should be able to exist before the very things exist, otherwise prophecies would not be possible. In his writings on universals Abelard does not go too far to investigate this, but there are passages, suggesting that the problem entered his mind in a peculiar form:

But the following question arises concerning the providence of the artist, whether it is empty when he holds in mind the form of a work still future, seeing that the thing is not yet constituted so. But if we grant that, we are forced to say that likewise the providence of God is empty, which he had before the creation of his work . . . Consequently, modifying the words we should say that the providence is not empty…(185)

Abelard promises: “There will be a fuller investigation of this in relation to the on Interpretation”, but he also says: “any question concerning the understanding with respect to God is superfluous”, and in the regular case of our knowledge he returns “to the conception of universals which must always be formed by abstraction” (185). But what is the nature of this abstraction compare to the abstraction of the concept of things?

When I hear man or whiteness or white I do not recall from the meaning of the noun all the natures or properties which are in the subject things, but from man I have only the conception although confused, not discrete, of animal and rational mortal, but not of the later accidents as well. For the conceptions of individuals, too, are formed by abstraction, when namely it is said: this substance, this body, this animal, this man, this whiteness, this white. For by this man I consider only the nature of man but related to a certain subject, whereas by man I consider that same nature simply in itself not related to anyone. Wherefore the understanding of universals is rightly spoken of as alone and naked and pure, that is, alone in regard to the senses, because it does not perceive the thing as sensual, and naked in regard to the abstraction of all and any forms, and pure with respect to discreteness because no thing whether it be matter or form, is designated in it; in this latter respect we called a conception of this sort confused above (186).

So, according to Abelard, we should understand universals as neither things no merely words, also he does not grant them the status of forms (which makes his position neither realistic no nominalistic!). They constitute a special class of confused but real concepts, which are also useful in our thinking of the natural world and our intellect as well.

IV

After having shown the nature of the universals Abelard proceeds to the resolution of the questions concerning genera and species:

The first question, then, was to this effect, whether genera and species subsist, that is signify something truly existent, or are placed in understanding alone, etc., that is, are located in empty opinion without the thing, like the following words, chimera and goat-stag which do not give rise to a rational understanding.

To this it must be replied that in truth they signify by nomination things truly existent, to wit, the same things as singular nouns, and in no wise are they located in empty opinion; nevertheless, they consist in a certain sense in the understanding alone and naked and pure, as has been determined.

(2) …whether subsisting they are corporeal or incorporeal, that is when they are considered to signify subsistences whether they signify subsistences which are corporeal or incorporeal. . . . I see that the existing things some are called corporeal and others incorporeal, which of these shall we say are the things signified by universals? To which the reply is made: in a certain sense corporeal things, that is things discrete in their essence and incorporeal with respect to the designation of the universal noun because obviously universals do not name discretely and determinately, but confusedly, as we have set forth sufficiently above. Whence the universal names themselves are called both corporeal with respect to the nature of things and incorporeal with respect to the manner of signification, because although they name things which are discrete, nevertheless they do not name them discretely and determinately.

(3) …whether they are placed in sensibles, etc., follows from granting that they are incorporeal, because obviously the incorporeal taken in a certain manner is divided by being and by not being in the sensible . . . . And universals are said to subsist in sensibles, that is to signify the intrinsic substance existing in a thing which is sensible by its exterior forms, and although they signify this substance which subsists actually in the sensible thing, yet they demonstrate the same substance naturally separated from the sensible thing, as we determined above in relation to Plato. Wherefore Boethius says that genera and species are understood, but are not, outside sensible things, in that obviously the things of genera and species are considered with respect to their nature rationally in themselves even when the exterior forms by which they come to the senses have been removed. . . . obviously they do not designate the sensible things which they name in the same manner as they are perceived, that is as discrete, and sense does not discover them by demonstration of them, it remained a question whether universals named sensible things only or whether they also signified something else; to which it is replied that they signify both sensible things and at the same time that common conception which Priscian ascribes particularly to the divine mind.

And in accord with them. With respect to that which we understand here as the fourth question , as we noted above, the following is the solution, that we in no wise hold that universal nouns are, when, their things having been destroyed, they are not predicable of many things inasmuch as they are not common to any things, as for example the name of the rose when there are no longer roses, but it would still, nevertheless, be significative by the understanding, although it would lack nomination; otherwise there would not be the proposition: there is no rose (187).

Here we can note that Abelard's answers are extremely sharp, flexible and inclusive. He concentrates on the different meanings in which the universals are applied and understood. He always keeps in mind the physical reality they refer to. He also states that they could be significative even without nomination. And this is, in my opinion, a very strong claim (among others mentioned above) against those who would like to call his solution a nominalistic one. Names, and universal names particularly, are not just mere “utterances”, because they signify being and not being of something in the physical world.

It must be noted, however, that although the definition of the universal or of the genus or the species includes only words, nevertheless these nouns are often transferred to their things, as when it is said that species is made up of genus and difference, that is, the thing of the species from the thing of the genus. For when the nature of words is examined with respect of signification, it is a question sometimes of words and sometimes of things, and frequently the names of the latter and the former are transferred reciprocally (188).

It can be seen now that it is neither nominalism no realism, because the words sometimes signify words and sometimes things. In his rather realistic inclination Abelard, who does not like to talk nonsense as well as to hear one, warns us:

For this reason most of all, the ambiguous treatment of logic as well as grammar leads many, who do not distinguish clearly and properly of the imposition of nouns or the abuse of transference, into error by the transference of nouns (188).

He wants us always to make sense or signify either things or words and understand what is that we are doing at the moment.

Now, I think, it is clear that there was a problem of universals at the time, otherwise there would be no alternative questions and attempted solutions about them. It seems that Abelard's solution was neither nominalistic, no realistic. He tried to give life of a meaningful concept to the universals, saying that they signify by nomination things truly existent, and some say he succeeded for another 300 years in his conceptualism. There is a reason why Abelard was not a peripatetic (meaning the follower of Aristotle). He could not, being a Christian theologian and the observer of Plato, considering his position with qualification (together with Boethius), but like almost every medieval thinker he was indebted to The Philosopher, which did not prevent him from being a very original thinker with rather synthetic tendencies.

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